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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WESLEY OSHLEY, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030193-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of two counts of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony (R. 313-15).1 This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (j) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Where defendant was on trial for a knife attack on members 
of his former girlfriend's family, was evidence of his prior 
knife attack on his former girlfriend admissible as prior bad 
acts evidence under rule 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
1
 The cover of defendant's Brief of Appellant correctly 
reflects that defendant was convicted on two counts of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, and one count of evading an 
officer, a second degree felony. Defendant, however, seeks 
relief only as to the two aggravated burglaries. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 21. The evading charge, therefore, is not before the 
Court on appeal. 
An appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard 
when reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence 
pursuant to rule 404(b). State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 142, 28 
P.3d 1278. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony; one count of aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony; one count of attempted aggravated 
kidnaping, a second degree felony; and one count of failure to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony (R. 
7-8). Defendant was tried by a jury, which found him guilty of 
both charges of aggravated burglary and of failure to respond to 
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an officer's signal to stop (R. 220-21). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to two consecutive five-to-life terms on the 
first degree felonies, and zero-to-five years on the third degree 
felony, to run concurrently with the second five-to-life term. 
The court ordered that defendant serve his sentence consecutive 
to the term he was already serving on another matter. Finally, 
the court imposed restitution of $835 (R. 313-15; 318-19). 
Defendant filed a timely appeal from the first-degree felony 
convictions (R. 316-17). This Court has jurisdiction over the 
case pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) (2003) (R. 328) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Becky G. was eighteen when she began dating the 21-year-old 
defendant in May of 2001 (R. 348: 92). Within three months, she 
became pregnant (Id. at 95). Becky felt ambivalent about both 
the relationship and the pregnancy, matters she discussed with 
her family and with defendant. Her older sister, Robin, 
testified that although defendant wanted Becky to keep the baby, 
"[Becky]
 was not okay with that" (R. 347 at 191). According to 
Robin, Becky did not feel "stable in the relationship or secure" 
and was "traumatized about the fact that she was pregnant, and 
she didn't feel ready" (Id.). Robin added, "I didn't want to see 
2
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. .See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 12, 999 P.2d 565. 
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Becky go through what I thought would be a very, very difficult 
time for her." (Id.). 
Becky testified that she discussed the pregnancy and the 
possibility of an abortion with defendant "extensively" before 
they broke up in late August (R. 348: 96). She and defendant 
talked for the last time about the pregnancy on the balcony of 
defendant's apartment (Id. at 109). Becky testified: 
I was telling [defendant] that I didn't feel 
like I could take care of a baby, that I 
wasn't ready for it. I didn't feel like I 
could do it and that I felt uncomfortable 
with it, and I wasn't sure whether I could 
keep the baby or not. And he told me — he 
told me that I was just like the rest of my 
people, and I wanted to kill everything. And 
I told him I thought it was stupid that he 
would say that to me. 
(Id.). Defendant then grabbed Becky, telling her she was 
"horrible" for not wanting to keep the baby, and forcibly took 
her inside to the bedroom (Id.). There, he began to choke her. 
She kicked back at him but could not get away. He choked her a 
second time until she nearly passed out (Id.). Eventually, he 
took her to the kitchen, grabbed a knife, and threatened to slit 
her throat if she screamed or tried to get away (Id. at 109-10). 
He then took her into the bathroom, asking her, "Are you scared? 
Do you know what I'm capable of?" (Id. at 110). 
Terrified, Becky "tried to just talk him down," which took 
about an hour. Defendant would not let Becky leave the apartment 
that night (Id.). The next morning, as soon as defendant left 
for work, Becky packed up her personal belongings and left (Id. 
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at 110). Not wanting any further contact with defendant, she 
refused his telephone calls or hung up as soon as she recognized 
his voice (Id. at 111) . Becky did not report the fight to the 
police because defendant "told me if I ever told anybody about 
it, he would go after my family" (Id. at 112). 
A week later, Becky terminated the pregnancy (Id.). Summing 
up her reasons, she cited the violent circumstances of her final 
night with defendant, defendant's escalating use of alcohol,3 and 
defendant's assertion that he would only act as a father figure 
to the child if it turned out to be a boy (Id.). 
•k -k * 
Close to two months later, at about 9 o'clock on a Friday 
evening in late October of 2001, one of Becky's younger sisters, 
Katie, was working as a bagger at Smith's when defendant, 
purchasing alcohol, approached her check stand (Id. at 84, 87). 
Defendant asked Katie "what Becky had done with the baby" (Id. at 
86). Katie initially told him "it wasn't my place and my 
responsibility to tell him," but eventually revealed that Becky 
"had not kept the baby" (Id.). Defendant left the store "mad" 
(Id. at 88-89). 
That same evening, Becky's mother, two of Becky's sisters, 
and a few of their friends visited a haunted house and then had a 
3
 Becky testified that, "almost every night," defendant 
"usually drank almost a 12-pack of beer to himself [sic], or he 
would have a lot of vodka. He would be able to drink probably 
about three-fourths of it himself" (R. 348: 118). 
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get-together at the apartment where Becky and her family lived 
(R. 347: 148, 197). By midnight, everyone had left except 
Becky's mother, Penny; her sisters, Robin and Megan; and a friend 
of Megan's who was spending the night (Id.). By about two 
o'clock in the morning, both Penny and Robin had gone to bed (Id. 
at 149, 197, 227). Megan and her friend stayed up, playing on 
the computer and later slipping out the unlocked front door to 
talk outside under a nearby tree for about an hour and a half 
(Id. at 227-29). 
Robin, "kind of half asleep," was awakened around three 
o'clock when someone opened her bedroom door and entered the room 
(Id. at 149, 183). Almost immediately, after pulling back the 
covers, the person was on top of her, violently grabbing her and 
sticking his fingers down her throat (Id. at 149, 154).4 The 
man's first words were, "Where's Becky?" (Id. at 153). Because 
the room was not very dark, Robin could see "well enough" and 
recognized the man as defendant (Id. at 153). She struggled with 
him, screaming, grabbing his hair, and biting his finger (Id.). 
Defendant put a knife to Robin's throat and threatened to kill 
her unless she "shut up" (Id. at 154). 
At that juncture, realizing "it wasn't a good idea to be 
fighting with [defendant] if he had a knife," Robin decided to 
4
 Defendant's attack on Robin also gave rise to charges of 
aggravated sexual assault and attempted aggravated kidnaping (R. 
7-8). The jury, however, acquitted him of these charges (R. 293-
94) . 
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"just wait. . . to see what he wanted or what was the purpose" 
(Id. at 157). Defendant ordered Robin to get dressed. As she 
did so, defendant continued to threaten her with the knife, and 
ask about Becky's whereabouts and whether she was scared (Id. at 
158-59). Robin repeatedly asked defendant what he wanted and 
told defendant that Becky was not at home (Id. at 159).5 
Defendant responded, "^Well, that's okay. I have you'" (Id.). 
Holding the knife to Robin's throat, defendant led her out 
the front door of the second-floor apartment and down a flight of 
stairs (Id. at 160). About half-way down, Robin broke away, ran 
back up the stairs, down a hallway, and then down another set of 
stairs at the other end of the hallway (Id. at 162-63). 
Defendant pursued her across the parking lot but then stopped 
(Id. at 167). Robin ran into another apartment building, found 
an unlocked door, burst in, and called the police (Id. at 167-
68) . 
Defendant, meanwhile, returned to Becky's family's 
apartment. Becky's mother, Penny, testified that she was 
awakened by defendant "standing over my bed with a very large 
butcher knife in his hand. He was threatening me with it, and he 
was telling me to get up"6 (Id. at 198) . While Penny quickly 
5
 Becky had gone to a friend's house that night and did not 
return home until the next morning around 7:30 a.m. (R. 347: 195, 
210; R. 348: 95). 
6
 Penny testified that she heard nothing of the earlier 
events involving defendant and Robin. She attributed this to 
sleeping with a "sound spa," which emitted white noise. In 
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dressed, defendant, "obviously upset," repeatedly demanded to 
know where Becky was. He commented "something along the lines 
that our family had ^F'-ed him over and that he tried to change 
his life for Becky" (Id. at 202). He then told Penny she was 
coming with him (Id. at 200-02). Defendant backed Penny out of 
her bedroom and into the bedroom normally shared by Becky and 
Megan (Id. at 200). Penny tried to reason with defendant; he 
kept repeating himself, unresponsive to her efforts. Eventually, 
defendant struck Penny in the face with his fist, using enough 
force to knock her down (Id. at 203). She testified, "I got up 
and continued to try and reason with him, and he hit me again. 
He hit me two more times in the same place"7 (Id.). Finally, 
defendant fled the apartment (Id. at 204). 
Penny immediately ran to check on her children. Robin was 
gone, as were Megan and her friend. In a panic, Penny called the 
police (Id^ at 205; R. 348: 8). 8 
Penny described defendant to the responding officer (R. 348: 
9). Within a few minutes after radio transmittal of the 
description, another officer spotted defendant and activated his 
addition, she had a fan running in her bedroom, and her bedroom 
door was closed (R. 347: 199) 
7
 Defendant's blows fractured Penny's nose and cheek bone 
on the left side (R. 347: 203). 
8
 Megan and her friend, talking under the tree, returned to 
the apartment shortly after defendant left for the second time 
but before the police arrived. They found the door locked, Robin 
gone, and Penny distraught and bleeding (R. 347: 230-31). 
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light bar and "wigwags" to stop him (Id. at 51-52). Defendant 
responded by leading the police on a high speed chase through 
city streets and then onto the freeway, at times reaching 105 
miles an hour (Id. at 52-56). The police executed several 
maneuvers to gain control of the situation, and defendant lost 
control of his vehicle more than once (Id. at 56-58) . The chase 
ended only after defendant hit a ditch that launched his vehicle 
into the air for almost 50 feet, disabling it on impact (Id. at 
68-70). 
When officers approached the vehicle, they found defendant 
locked inside, clutching a knife, spouting profanities, and 
actively resisting removal by rigidly gripping the steering wheel 
or headrest (Id. at 13, 71, 81-82). Although defendant complied 
with the order to drop the knife,9 police had to use force to 
remove him from the vehicle (Id. at 82). And, once outside the 
vehicle, additional force was necessary to handcuff him (Id.). 
Defendant was transported to a hospital, where his blood 
alcohol level was determined to be .11 (Id. at 60). 
9
 Penny later identified the weapon as a Cutco knife, one 
of a set, kept in her kitchen, that her son had given her while 




WHERE DEFENDANT WAS ON TRIAL FOR A 
KNIFE ATTACK ON HIS EX-GIRLFRIEND'S 
FAMILY, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING, 
PURSUANT TO RULE 404(B), EVIDENCE 
THAT HE HAD ALSO PREVIOUSLY 
ATTACKED HIS EX-GIRLFRIEND WITH A 
KNIFE 
Defendant argues that Becky's testimony about her violent 
evening with defendant just prior to breaking up with him 
violated rule 404 (b) because the testimony was offered "solely to 
prove bad character and that he had a propensity to commit crime 
and that he acted in conformity with that character" (Br. of 
Aplt. at 14). Defendant further asserts that, even assuming the 
evidence was offered for a proper non-character purpose, it was 
not relevant and should have been excluded pursuant to rule 402 
(Id. at 16-17). Finally, he contends that the trial court 
misapplied rule 403 by determining that the probative value of 
the testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
impact. In defendant's view, the evidence was so highly 
inflammatory that, had it not been admitted, he would likely have 
received a more favorable verdict (Id. at 14, 20-21). 
Defendant's claim is governed by rule 404(b), which includes 
analysis under rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
That is, "in deciding whether evidence of other crimes is 
admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court must determine (1) 
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter 
-10-
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 403." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 120, 
993 P.2d 837. Here, the trial court applied rule 404(b), 
determining that Becky's testimony addressing her last encounter 
with defendant was relevant and admissible: 
[T]he testimony relates to multiple questions 
relating to the trial proceeding, which 
include, amongst other things, questions of 
motive, the relationship of [Becky] to 
[defendant], reasons for his presence at the 
apartment, and other matters which I think 
are relevant and probative. 
R. 348: 104. The court also referenced a balancing test, 
concluding: 
In weighing the probative value of the 
testimony as opposed to the prejudicial 
effect, I find that it is more probative than 
prejudicial, knowing also the time and scope 
I've heard to this juncture. Therefore, I'll 
allow the examination. 
Id.10 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by so ruling. 
A. Rule 404 (b) 
Rule 404(b), governing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts to prove the character of a person, is an "inclusionary" 
rule. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993); State 
10
 In fact, rule 403 calls for a determination of whether 
the probative value of the evidence "is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis 
added). The court's application of a simple balancing test, and 
its statement that the testimony was more probative than 
prejudicial necessarily encompasses within it a determination 
that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 
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v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). That is, "[r]ule 
404(b) does not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; 
rather, it allows admission of relevant evidence ^other than to 
show merely the general disposition of the defendant.'" State v. 
Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989)(quoting State v. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983)). This approach admits 
"all evidence of other crimes relevant to an issue at trial 
except that evidence that proves only criminal disposition." 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 568 (citing 2 J.Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein' s Evidence, § 404[08] (1990) ) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Becky's testimony served the non-character 
purpose of completing the story for the jury. By explaining the 
circumstances surrounding her breakup with defendant, Becky 
helped the jury understand why the relationship ended, why she 
opted for an abortion, and why defendant was so angry about that 
decision. That is, while the jury already knew that Becky was 
ambivalent about the pregnancy, her choice to abort made far more 
sense in the context of defendant's deteriorating pattern of 
behavior, including his escalating use of alcohol, his statements 
about only being a father to a male child and, ultimately, his 
violent behavior towards her (R. 348: 112, 118).n 
11
 Becky also testified that she was Caucasian and 
defendant was Native American and that he "would sometimes say 
things like, your people are different, and, your people do 
things that my people would never do" (R. 348: 117). In this 
context, Becky testified that on the night of the fight, 
defendant angrily told her she "was just like the rest of [her] 
people, and [she] wanted to kill everything" (Id. at 109). The 
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Evidence that completes a story by filling in facts 
necessary for a jury to understand the context of a crime is 
admissible as non-character evidence under rule 404 (b) . See 
State v. Dominquez, 2003 UT App 158, 521, 72 P.3d 127 (admitting 
testimony that provides necessary context for other admissible 
evidence relevant to crime at issue); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that although rule 404 
contains no express exception for "background information" 
showing how the charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled 
to paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in 
question transpired"); State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 
1986)(holding that evidence showing "the general circumstances 
surrounding" the crime should not be excluded as "prior crimes" 
evidence under rule 404(b)). Because Becky's testimony about the 
circumstances of her breakup with defendant provided relevant 
background for the context of defendant's subsequent criminal 
conduct, it was properly admitted under rule 404(b). 
Becky's testimony also went directly to defendant's defense. 
Although defendant conceded that he went to the apartment at 
about three o'clock in the morning, that he grabbed Robin by the 
shoulder and shook her, and that he "smacked" Penny in 
frustration, he consistently denied that he ever threatened 
cultural chasm expressed through defendant's words explains 
defendant's extreme reaction upon learning that Becky had 
terminated the pregnancy. It explains the context in which he 
went to her apartment and tried desperately and irrationally to 
locate her. 
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either Robin or Penny with a knife (R. 348: 134, 138, 140, 143). 
Becky's testimony of a similar knife threat six weeks earlier 
thus goes directly to an issue defendant contests - whether he 
attacked Robin and Penny with a dangerous weapon. See State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 129, 6 P.3d 1120 (similarity in type 
of crime combined with temporal proximity "Virtually guarantees 
admittance of prior bad acts evidence'")(citation omitted). 
B. Rule 402 
Becky's testimony also plainly complied with rule 402, which 
governs relevance. If the evidence "tends to prove some fact 
material to the crime charged," it will be admitted, even though 
it may also tend to prove that defendant committed other crimes 
or bad acts. State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah 
1982); accord State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 531, 61 P.3d 291 
("[I]f prior bad acts evidence ^tends to prove some fact that is 
material to the crime charged,' it is relevant and admissible 
under rule 402")(citation omitted). 
Here, Becky's testimony explained the nature of the 
relationship between Becky and defendant, which prompted her to 
seek an abortion and motivated defendant's later criminal acts. 
It also explained that Becky and defendant were operating under 
different cultural assumptions that gave rise to different 
attitudes about terminating a pregnancy. Her testimony that she 
hadn't told anyone about the fight because defendant had 
threatened to "go after" her family also helped explain 
-14-
defendant's motive in violently attacking both Robin and Penny 
when he was unable to locate Becky at the apartment. Defendant 
himself had testified that Becky's mother and sister had become 
involved in Becky's decisions about the relationship and the 
pregnancy, a reality defendant resented (R. 348: 130-31). His 
earlier remarks to Becky corroborated his belief that Becky's 
family influenced her decision-making and could be held 
accountable for Becky's actions. 
C. Rule 403 
Becky's testimony also complied with rule 403, which gives a 
trial court the discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence," Utah R. Evid. 403 
(emphasis added). The fact that evidence may be prejudicial does 
not alone render it incompetent. Rather, "[i]f evidence is 
prejudicial but is at least equally probative of a critical fact, 
it is properly admissible." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571. 
Indeed, all relevant evidence is presumed admissible pursuant to 
rule 403 unless it has "an unusual propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). 
In balancing the probative value of rule 404(b) evidence 
against the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant, factors such 
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as "^the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime [or misconduct], the similarities between the crimes, 
the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the 
degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility'" are relevant. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 150, 28 
P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 
1988) ). 1 2 Of these factors, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
"
>[P]roximity in time combined with similarity in type of crime 
virtually guarantees admittance of prior bad acts evidence.'" 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at 129 (quoting United 
States v. Drew, 894 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
In this case, the combination of proximity and similarity 
renders Becky's testimony highly probative and, consequently, 
admissible. First, there were strong similarities between 
defendant's attack on Becky and his later attacks on Robin and 
Penny. In all three instances, defendant took a knife from the 
kitchen and brandished it against the women in a life-threatening 
manner (R. 347: 154; R. 348: 109-10). He told both Becky and 
Robin to shut up or he would kill them or slit their throats (R. 
12
 If the evidence weighs in favor of probativeness, 
defendant is entitled to a cautionary jury instruction, limiting 
the applicability of the evidence. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
at 296. Defendant, however, must request such an instruction. 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). Here, 
defendant failed to do so. See R. 88-123. His inaction 
constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal. State v. Rocco, 795 
P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1990). 
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347: 153; R. 348: 110). He also tried to choke Becky and Robin, 
later pointedly asking each of them, "Are you scared?" or "Do you 
know what I can do?" (R. 347: 158, 180; R. 348: 109, 110). He 
was physically and verbally aggressive with all three women, 
forcing them from room to room at his will (R. 347: 149-50, 154, 
160; R. 348: 109). 
Second, only six weeks passed between Becky's violent last 
night with defendant and the night of the crimes at issue here. 
This is not a significant interval. See, e.g., State v. Holbert, 
2002 UT App 426 at 1141 (three-month interval between choking 
incident and crime at issue considered "minimal"); State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at 129 (time between all incidents 
was "a brief ten weeks"); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 132 
(seven-month interval deemed "relatively short"). 
Furthermore, in addition to the similarities between the 
crimes and their temporal proximity, Becky's testimony was not 
the sort of evidence that would "rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571 (citation omitted). 
The evidence of the earlier attack on Becky was "no worse than 
the evidence" of the later attacks on her sister or mother. 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60 at 152. Indeed, after hearing from 
Robin and Penny, the jury simply heard more of the same type of 
conduct from Becky. There were few details in Becky's recitation 
that were substantively different from the later attack on Robin, 
to which Robin had already testified. 
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Because Becky's testimony was relevant for the non-character 
purpose of completing the story and because defendant has failed 
to articulate how the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighed the probative value of that testimony, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in permitting Becky to testify about 
her violent last night with defendant. 
And, in any event, even if the trial court erred in 
admitting Becky's testimony, the error was harmless. Other 
jurisdictions that have considered the question of an erroneous 
admission of Rule 404 (b) evidence have ruled that if the 
admission of the evidence was harmless, there is no necessity for 
reversal. See. State v. Halstien, 857 P.2d 270, 281 (Wash. 
1993)(ruling that the trial court's failure to "weigh any 
prejudicial effect did not substantially affect the outcome and 
is harmless error"); State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593, 656 (Ariz. 
1992)(holding that because no "reasonable probability exists that 
the verdict would have been different" the error in admitting the 
404(b) testimony was harmless); McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 
753 (Wyo. 1993) ("the admission of the tire slashing evidence was 
an abuse of discretion by the district court because it violated 
W.R.E. 404(b). However, we cannot conclude that the jury would 
likely have reached a different verdict had this evidence been 
excluded"). 
Similarly, in this case, even assuming arguendo that the 
testimony should not have been admitted, any error in its 
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admission would have been harmless. See State v. O'Neil, 848 
P.2d at 699 ("Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal of a 
conviction only where we conclude there is a ^reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings'")(citation omitted). Here, even absent Becky's 
testimony, the verdict against defendant would likely have 
remained the same. Defendant was convicted of two counts of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony (R. 313-15). In this 
case, an aggravated burglary conviction would require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of entering or remaining unlawfully in 
a dwelling with intent to commit a felony or assault. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202. Absent the challenged testimony, the jury 
still had before it testimony from both Penny and Robin that 
defendant entered and remained in their apartment without 
permission and that he intentionally assaulted both of them. 
See R. 347: 151, 154, 202-04. 
Further, aggravated burglary requires that the actor "causes 
bodily injury" or "uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1)(a),(b). Here, 
wholly apart from the challenged testimony, both Robin and Penny 
testified that defendant threatened them with a large and 
distinctive Cutco knife, part of a set that Penny's son had given 
her (R. 347: 155, 170, 206). When defendant was finally 
apprehended after the high-speed car chase, officers found him 
clutching that very knife (R. 348: 20, 81). Denying that he took 
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it from the apartment, defendant could only explain its presence 
by stating, "me and my brother were going to have a cookout" (Id. 
at 143). In addition, Penny unequivocally testified that 
defendant caused her bodily injury by punching her so hard in the 
face that he fractured her nose and cheek bone (Id. at 203). 
Given the strength of this evidence, even if the trial court 
were found to have abused its discretion in admitting Becky's 
testimony about her violent last night with defendant, there was 
no substantial likelihood that, absent the testimony, the outcome 
would have been different. Any error as to its admission, 
therefore, was harmless. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431; 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions on two counts of aggravated burglary, a first degree 
felony. 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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